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ClickFix: The Gift That Keeps On Giving
ClickFix: The Gift That Keeps On Giving
Technical deep dive into ClickFix tradecraft, a sophisticated social engineering driven initial access technique. Covers delivery methods, execution specializations, payload analysis, and detection strategies based on OrangeCon 2026 research.
·kqlquery.com·
ClickFix: The Gift That Keeps On Giving
Reverse engineering Malwarebytes Browser Guard | msil.re
Reverse engineering Malwarebytes Browser Guard | msil.re
Static analysis of Browser Guard 3.1.5 (15M+ installs): Zstd-encoded on-disk databases, the heuristic rule engine that scans the live DOM, the Hubble false-positive service, the package update protocol, and a debug URL interface left in production. With reimplementations in C# and Python.
·msil.re·
Reverse engineering Malwarebytes Browser Guard | msil.re
Abusing CAPE Sandbox from the Inside | msil.re
Abusing CAPE Sandbox from the Inside | msil.re
CAPE's agent exposes unauthenticated localhost routes to the sample under analysis, enough to fingerprint the sandbox, plant bogus network IOCs on VirusTotal, and shut the whole analysis down with a single request.
·msil.re·
Abusing CAPE Sandbox from the Inside | msil.re
CVE-2026-13117 — OpenVPN tls-crypt-v2 Renegotiation Heap Use-After-Free
CVE-2026-13117 — OpenVPN tls-crypt-v2 Renegotiation Heap Use-After-Free
A use-after-free in OpenVPN's tls-crypt-v2. The safety check meant to stop the server sending a client freed memory has a blind spot, so during a routine key renegotiation OpenVPN frees a buffer it's about to send — and hands whatever now sits in that memory to the client.
·labs.trace37.com·
CVE-2026-13117 — OpenVPN tls-crypt-v2 Renegotiation Heap Use-After-Free
RustDuck: An In-Depth Analysis of a Two-Stage Botnet
RustDuck: An In-Depth Analysis of a Two-Stage Botnet
Overview Since February 2026, the XLAB large-scale network threat perception system has detected a new malware family active in cyberspace that adopts a Loader + Core (two-stage loading) architecture. Currently, the family has spawned multiple variants, with the main core functionality being the execution of large-scale Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. It also possesses strong cross-platform adaptability and continuous evolution capabilities. Although the family's current activi
·blog.xlab.qianxin.com·
RustDuck: An In-Depth Analysis of a Two-Stage Botnet
Content-Type Override to Stored XSS on Public Objects
Content-Type Override to Stored XSS on Public Objects
A single response-content-type query parameter on a public bucket object turns a forced image/png into text/html, which is stored XSS on the target's own origin. MinIO hands it to you for free. S3 takes one extra step.
·blog.voorivex.team·
Content-Type Override to Stored XSS on Public Objects
Beacon as You’ve Never Seen it Before
Beacon as You’ve Never Seen it Before
Deep dive into Beacons: what they are, how they run in memory, the evolution of loaders (including prepended/Kayn styles), and the security implications defenders need to know.
·0xdbgman.github.io·
Beacon as You’ve Never Seen it Before
Dissecting Apple's Sparse Image Format (ASIF) | schamper.dev
Dissecting Apple's Sparse Image Format (ASIF) | schamper.dev
At WWDC 2025, Apple announced macOS 26 Tahoe. One of the new features in macOS Tahoe is a new disk image format: ASIF. Designed for use with virtual machines (its documentation lives under the Virtualization framework), ASIF takes a lot of inspiration from existing virtual disk formats. Practically, that means it’s another sparse virtual disk format, and functions very similar to sparse VMDK, VHDX or QCOW2 files (for the uninitiated, it allow you to store a large disk, or file, in a smaller, “sparse” manner).
·schamper.dev·
Dissecting Apple's Sparse Image Format (ASIF) | schamper.dev