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How to get a free .arpa domain
How to get a free .arpa domain
Learn how to get a free .arpa domain by abusing IPv6 reverse DNS delegations on Hurricane Electric, configuring deSEC, and hosting a live website.
·hawksley.dev·
How to get a free .arpa domain
CSS:the bomb inside your inbox
CSS:the bomb inside your inbox
Gareth Heyes - gareth.heyes@portswigger.net - @garethheyes It's quite common for webmail clients to render untrusted CSS in a trusted UI. They attempt to make this safe using CSS sanitization. In this
·portswigger.net·
CSS:the bomb inside your inbox
New Technique Bypass File Upload
New Technique Bypass File Upload
New Technique Bypass File Upload This write-up focuses on bypass file upload. Introduction During my security research on Outlook Web, I encountered an unusual behavior that led me to discover a …
·infosecwriteups.com·
New Technique Bypass File Upload
The Cold Email
The Cold Email
Written pieces, talks, and other bits by Zach Holman.
·zachholman.com·
The Cold Email
Content-Type Override to Stored XSS on Public Objects
Content-Type Override to Stored XSS on Public Objects
A single response-content-type query parameter on a public bucket object turns a forced image/png into text/html, which is stored XSS on the target's own origin. MinIO hands it to you for free. S3 takes one extra step.
·blog.voorivex.team·
Content-Type Override to Stored XSS on Public Objects
CVE-2026-41873: Apache Pony Mail OAuth SSRF + Lua CRLF Smuggling = Unauthenticated Account Takeover
CVE-2026-41873: Apache Pony Mail OAuth SSRF + Lua CRLF Smuggling = Unauthenticated Account Takeover
STAR Labs’ advisory on CVE-2026-41873 in Apache Pony Mail by Li Jiantao and Tevel Sho (disclosed 28 April 2026). Two independent bugs reach the same outcome — full admin takeover — without any authentication. In the modern Foal (Python) build, an attacker-supplied "oauth_token" URL drives a blind SSRF against the local Elasticsearch SQL endpoint, leaking the admin session cookie character-by-character (CVSS 9.1). In the legacy Lua build (now retired, no patch), a single unescaped query parameter in "email.lua" lets the attacker inject CRLF bytes into the Elasticsearch HTTP request and smuggle a second request that creates an admin account outright.
·core-jmp.org·
CVE-2026-41873: Apache Pony Mail OAuth SSRF + Lua CRLF Smuggling = Unauthenticated Account Takeover
RainLoop Webmail - Emails at Risk due to Code Flaw
RainLoop Webmail - Emails at Risk due to Code Flaw
Sonar researchers discovered a critical stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in RainLoop Webmail that allows attackers to hijack user sessions and steal emails simply by sending a malicious email. The article explains the root cause, exploitation, and security implications.
RainLoop
·sonarsource.com·
RainLoop Webmail - Emails at Risk due to Code Flaw
Gaining Initial Access and Outsmarting SmartScreen
Gaining Initial Access and Outsmarting SmartScreen
I’ve had a number of people ask me what approaches I have taken to secure that initial foothold on a machine/network during a pentest engagement. Well, the blunt and honest answer to that question is…it depends 😸 Initial access comes in many forms and depending on the type of pentest engagement, you will be afforded or NOT afforded various types of “lures” you can use to acquire that first foothold. Most clients are open to the pentest team exhausting all their resources and offensive tooling to truly assess the client’s security controls. If not they should be. Because in a real world attack, you better believe the threat actor will not hold back! In today’s post, I’ll be going over a very traditional approach to achieving initial access using email as our attack vector of choice. I’ll go over various ways to send the email (gui and non-gui) and using attachments versus links. I’ll also explain how to contend with MOTW (Mark of the Web) and SmartScreen security restrictions on your downloaded payloads for the modern Windows 11 environment.
·g3tsyst3m.com·
Gaining Initial Access and Outsmarting SmartScreen
Trust Me, I’m a Shortcut
Trust Me, I’m a Shortcut
Windows’ primary mechanism for shortcuts, LNK files, is frequently abused by threat actors for payload delivery and persistence. This blog post introduces several new LNK file flaws that, amongst other things, allow attackers to fully spoof an LNK’s target. It also introduces lnk-it-up, a tool suite that can generate such deceptive LNK files, as well as detect anomalous ones.
·wietzebeukema.nl·
Trust Me, I’m a Shortcut