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PaperCut NG/MF CVE-2026-81578 + CVE-2026-82078 unauthenticated RCE chain
PaperCut NG/MF CVE-2026-81578 + CVE-2026-82078 unauthenticated RCE chain
Prove or reject unauthenticated remote OS command execution as the PaperCut service account on stock PaperCut NG/MF 25.0.11 via a pre-auth Release Station / MFD card-ID flow reaching the external card-lookup runtime, then replay identically on stock 25.0.12 to confirm the fix blocks the chain. This maps to the PaperCut NG/MF URGENT Security Bulletin of 27 Aug 2026 active exploitation, all versions affected . Whether a stock remote mechanism exists is an open question; card-ID SQL injection and JDBC URL injection are unproven hypotheses only.
·pruva.dev·
PaperCut NG/MF CVE-2026-81578 + CVE-2026-82078 unauthenticated RCE chain
The Click that shouldn’t have worked: RCE via clickjacking in Internet Explorer
The Click that shouldn’t have worked: RCE via clickjacking in Internet Explorer
Author’s note: this article describes vulnerabilities in ascending order of severity. If you want to skip straight to the most interesting part, feel free to read it from the bottom up. Even though Internet Explorer officially reached its end of life in 2020, its core engine remains widely used in the form of the WebBrowser […]
·swarm.ptsecurity.com·
The Click that shouldn’t have worked: RCE via clickjacking in Internet Explorer
The Gold Mine Red Teamers Never Touch
The Gold Mine Red Teamers Never Touch
The Problem If you are like me, you have found yourself digging through Microsoft specifications and RFC documentation trying to wrangle with a new exploit or tooling to get DA faster than your peers. The biggest problem one may encounter is the specifications are meant for developers; they will tell you the song and dance in its entirety, but it never goes beyond in any way that may be useful for you to weaponize. Fixing that may potentially lay with using the Windows 2003 Source code.
·abdulmhsblog.com·
The Gold Mine Red Teamers Never Touch
Finding CVE-2020-1321: Fuzzing Microsoft Office's 3D Model Parser - Ariel Koren
Finding CVE-2020-1321: Fuzzing Microsoft Office's 3D Model Parser - Ariel Koren
A grammar-driven .glb fuzzing campaign found a memory-corruption bug in the shared 3D parser used by Microsoft Word and the Microsoft 3D Viewer. The same input crashed both products at matching call-site offsets. Reported to the Microsoft Security Response Center on January 30, 2020. Microsoft published the fix on June 9, 2020 as the Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, graded Important, CVSS 7.8, exploitation less likely.
·arielkoren.com·
Finding CVE-2020-1321: Fuzzing Microsoft Office's 3D Model Parser - Ariel Koren
CVE-2026-6307 (Part 2): Turbofan JS-to-Wasm Deopt Type Confusion - Tashita Software Security
CVE-2026-6307 (Part 2): Turbofan JS-to-Wasm Deopt Type Confusion - Tashita Software Security
Authored by stratan In Part 1, we went over the background details that are needed to follow along, as well as the trigger specifics of the bug. In Part 2, we'll go through the relevant code paths, analyze the patch, and develop an in-cage read/write primitive. Disclaimer This article has been prepared for
·tashita.net·
CVE-2026-6307 (Part 2): Turbofan JS-to-Wasm Deopt Type Confusion - Tashita Software Security
Zero Day Initiative — CVE-2026-33824: Remote Code Execution in Windows IKEv2
Zero Day Initiative — CVE-2026-33824: Remote Code Execution in Windows IKEv2
In this excerpt of a TrendAI Research Services vulnerability report, Richard Chen and Lucas Miller of the TrendAI Research team detail a recently patched double free vulnerability in the Windows Internet Key Exchange (IKE) service. This bug was originally discovered by WARP & MORSE team at
·zerodayinitiative.com·
Zero Day Initiative — CVE-2026-33824: Remote Code Execution in Windows IKEv2
Living off the Process
Living off the Process
Hello again everyone! Hope the start to the new year is treating you well. I am excited to share a new blog post with you! Furthermore, I’d consider the content shared in today’s post to be the most time I’ve spent in researching a particular offensive security topic/technique 😹 I’d say I spent well over a month looking into this exciting topic and I wanted to make sure I had all my research completed before I jumped in to making a post. Without further ado, I give you my take on what I’d like to call: Living off the Process! This is a technique that does as the name implies: We use what is already available to us in the remote process of our choosing to accomplish a given goal. In this case, the goal will be to write shellcode indirectly into the remote process with as low of a footprint as possible. When I say indirectly, I mean we won’t be using WriteProcessMemory to write the shellcode. That API does play a small role, but ultimately we will be indirectly writing our shellcode in 8 byte chunks using ROP gadgets and assembly stubs all made available in the remote process. We will also avoid the creation of RWX regions of memory. Here’s a quick overview on how it all works. We will be looking for:
·g3tsyst3m.com·
Living off the Process
Silent Killers: Unmasking a Large-Scale Legacy Driver Exploitation Campaign - Check Point Research
Silent Killers: Unmasking a Large-Scale Legacy Driver Exploitation Campaign - Check Point Research
Highlights Introduction While the abuse of vulnerable drivers has been around for a while, those that can terminate arbitrary processes have drawn increasing attention in recent years. As Windows security continues to evolve, it has become more challenging for attackers to execute malicious code without being detected. As a result, the attackers often aim to […]
·research.checkpoint.com·
Silent Killers: Unmasking a Large-Scale Legacy Driver Exploitation Campaign - Check Point Research
Who’s on the Line? Exploiting RCE in Windows Telephony Service
Who’s on the Line? Exploiting RCE in Windows Telephony Service
Windows has supported computer telephony integration for decades, providing applications with the ability to manage phone devices, lines, and calls. While modern deployments increasingly rely on cloud-based telephony solutions, classic telephony services remain available out of the box in Windows and continue to be used in specialized environments. As a result, legacy telephony components still […]
·swarm.ptsecurity.com·
Who’s on the Line? Exploiting RCE in Windows Telephony Service
Historical Analysis of Reflected Vulnerabilities: The Evolution of Windows Defender Defenses
Historical Analysis of Reflected Vulnerabilities: The Evolution of Windows Defender Defenses
This report analyzes a historical class of security flaws known as “reflected vulnerabilities,”which were once potent zero-day attack vectors targeting early Windows versions and antivirussoftware. We examine classic exploitation techniques, such as parser attacks, packet fragmen-tation, and syscall abuse, which could lead to remote code execution (RCE) or privilege esca-lation. The objective is educational, demonstrating how modern defenses in Windows 11 andWindows Defender—such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), Data ExecutionPrevention (DEP), Control Flow Guard (CFG), and hardened parsers—have rendered this classof vulnerabilities obsolete. Proof-of-concept (PoC) code is provided solely to illustrate histor-ical concepts and is non-functional on modern systems, ensuring compliance with responsibledisclosure principles.
·zenodo.org·
Historical Analysis of Reflected Vulnerabilities: The Evolution of Windows Defender Defenses