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SLEEPWALKER: A Passive Backdoor With Its Own Command Language
SLEEPWALKER: A Passive Backdoor With Its Own Command Language
Losing access to VirusTotal Intelligence at the start of the year was surprisingly productive. Unable to hunt for interesting new malware, I stopped adding to my “TODO” pile and finally worked through my backlog from last year. That led to a detailed examination of BeheMOF as well as the discovery of this malware. Upon closer inspection, a sample that did not seem too noteworthy at first turned out to have a distinctive design once I looked under the hood: a passive backdoor that opens no obvious listening port and carries no payload inside itself. It waits in memory doing nothing at all until one specifically crafted network packet reaches the machine, which is why I am calling it SLEEPWALKER.
·r136a1.dev·
SLEEPWALKER: A Passive Backdoor With Its Own Command Language
GAP - Ghost Anchor Persistence: Fileless Extension Persistence in Chromium Browsers
GAP - Ghost Anchor Persistence: Fileless Extension Persistence in Chromium Browsers
Browser extensions are an underestimated attack surface. They run natively in the browser, are trusted by design, have access to cookies, network requests, and every page the user visits - and most EDRs don’t even look at them. In a post-exploitation context, a malicious extension operating as an agent is practically invisible to standard endpoint security tooling.
·fir3n0x.github.io·
GAP - Ghost Anchor Persistence: Fileless Extension Persistence in Chromium Browsers
CaptiveCrunch: Midnight Blizzard targets travelers worldwide for malware delivery and credential theft | Microsoft Security Blog
CaptiveCrunch: Midnight Blizzard targets travelers worldwide for malware delivery and credential theft | Microsoft Security Blog
Storm-2945, a sub-cluster of the Russian threat actor Midnight Blizzard, has been observed compromising the sign-in portals of hospitality-related organizations such as hotels since May 2026 in order to deliver malware to travelers and steal credentials in an operation we call CaptiveCrunch.
·microsoft.com·
CaptiveCrunch: Midnight Blizzard targets travelers worldwide for malware delivery and credential theft | Microsoft Security Blog
One Bool. Six Shells. AMSI’s Design Problem.
One Bool. Six Shells. AMSI’s Design Problem.
A research study into the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) combining Ghidra decompilation of amsi.dll, Frida dynamic instrumentation, and live bypass testing with Windows Defender active. Six techniques are documented that achieve full Invoke-Expression bypass and were each confirmed end-to-end with a live reverse shell payload (Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTcp) against a patched Windows 11 host.
·bl4ckarch.github.io·
One Bool. Six Shells. AMSI’s Design Problem.
More Evidence That Words Don't Mean What We Thought They Meant (Ivanti Sentry Pre-Auth OS Command Injection CVE-2026-10520)
More Evidence That Words Don't Mean What We Thought They Meant (Ivanti Sentry Pre-Auth OS Command Injection CVE-2026-10520)
Today, Ivanti published an advisory. “No way?” we hear you say. "Yes way!" a random dog screams back at you, across the street. Today’s rare advisory outlines two vulnerabilities in Ivanti’s Sentry product, appealing directly to our inner desire for sophisticated server-side, pre-authenticated vulnerabilities. With our inner desire only partially satisfied, we found adults who could help us read the advisory. We were kindly told that although Ivanti managed to provide minimal information, the
·labs.watchtowr.com·
More Evidence That Words Don't Mean What We Thought They Meant (Ivanti Sentry Pre-Auth OS Command Injection CVE-2026-10520)
EDR Tradecraft: Internals, Detection, Evasion & Advanced Researchg
EDR Tradecraft: Internals, Detection, Evasion & Advanced Researchg
Technical reference on modern EDR architecture, detection mechanisms, evasion techniques, and reverse-engineering methodology. Covers kernel callback APIs, file-system mini-filters, ETW providers, the four detection-engine model, syscall gates (FreshyCalls, RecycledGate, SysWhispers4, Acheron, Sysplant), sleep obfuscation (Ekko, FOLIAGE, DreamWalkers), call-stack spoofing (SilentMoonwalk, VulcanRaven), ETW-TI hardware-breakpoint bypass, patchless AMSI bypass via VEH, BYOVD against the vulnerable-driver blocklist, and the eight-phase EDR research methodology.
·0xdbgman.github.io·
EDR Tradecraft: Internals, Detection, Evasion & Advanced Researchg
The Citizen Lab Bad Connection: Uncovering Global Telecom Exploitation by Covert Surveillance Actors
The Citizen Lab Bad Connection: Uncovering Global Telecom Exploitation by Covert Surveillance Actors
Our investigation uncovers two sophisticated telecom surveillance campaigns and, for the first time, links real-world attack traffic to mobile operator signalling infrastructure. The findings expose how suspected commercial surveillance vendors (CSVs) exploit the global telecom interconnect ecosystem, leverage private operator networks, and conduct covert location tracking operations that can persist undetected for years.
·citizenlab.ca·
The Citizen Lab Bad Connection: Uncovering Global Telecom Exploitation by Covert Surveillance Actors
Атаки на финансовый сектор глазами PT SWARM: социальная инженерия 2025
Атаки на финансовый сектор глазами PT SWARM: социальная инженерия 2025
Мы в PT SWARM, как сейчас модно говорить, любим челленджи — ставить перед собой большие и сложные задачи, которые решаем путем их разбивки на
·ptresearch.media·
Атаки на финансовый сектор глазами PT SWARM: социальная инженерия 2025
Trust Me, I’m a Shortcut
Trust Me, I’m a Shortcut
Windows’ primary mechanism for shortcuts, LNK files, is frequently abused by threat actors for payload delivery and persistence. This blog post introduces several new LNK file flaws that, amongst other things, allow attackers to fully spoof an LNK’s target. It also introduces lnk-it-up, a tool suite that can generate such deceptive LNK files, as well as detect anomalous ones.
·wietzebeukema.nl·
Trust Me, I’m a Shortcut
Someone Knows Bash Far Too Well, And We Love It (Ivanti EPMM Pre-Auth RCEs CVE-2026-1281 & CVE-2026-1340)
Someone Knows Bash Far Too Well, And We Love It (Ivanti EPMM Pre-Auth RCEs CVE-2026-1281 & CVE-2026-1340)
When Ivanti removed the embargoes from CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340 - actively exploited pre-auth Remote Command Execution vulnerabilities in Ivanti’s Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) solution - we sighed with relief. Clearly, the universe had decided to continue mocking Secure-By-Design signers right on schedule - every January. Welcome back to another
·labs.watchtowr.com·
Someone Knows Bash Far Too Well, And We Love It (Ivanti EPMM Pre-Auth RCEs CVE-2026-1281 & CVE-2026-1340)